

Executive Policy Seminar Series
Capital Markets Research Center

Double Exposure: Dealing with Iraq and North Korea

The Honorable Robert L. Gallucci
Dean, School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

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Introduction

David A. Walker

Director, Capital Markets Research Center

I am honored to welcome one of Georgetown University's leading scholars, who is a public servant and is leading one of our most prestigious schools. Robert L. Gallucci became Dean of the Georgetown Edmund A. Walsh School for Foreign Service on May 1, 1996, while continuing his distinguished career as Department of State Ambassador at Large and special envoy to deal with the threat of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. When the Georgetown School of Business began, it was a division of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.

Between 1974 and 1994, Ambassador Gallucci served in a variety of important positions with the United States Department of State – leading the Sinai Peacekeeping Force, Deputy Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq, and Senior Coordinator for nonproliferation and nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union.

Dr. Gallucci completed his undergraduate studies at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and his Master of Arts and Ph.D. degrees at Brandeis University. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by his undergraduate alma mater, an honor that few people receive.

He has taught at Swarthmore, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown. He has been awarded numerous fellowships from many prestigious organizations, including Harvard, the Brookings Institution, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dean Gallucci is the author of the book entitled *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet Nam*.

Tonight Dean Gallucci has agreed to speak about our double exposures in Iraq and North Korea. When we recall his remarks and read the published version, we do need to remember that he is speaking on March 4, 2003, and none of us knows whether the United States will be involved in military action in Iraq.

Double Exposure: Dealing with Iraq and North Korea The Honorable Robert L. Gallucci

Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Experience

I am pleased to be with you this evening to share some thoughts about the situation in Iraq and North Korea. To establish a basis for my comments, I would like to review some of my experience. My principal mission in government in the late 1970's and early 1980's was to stop Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons. Before that I was in the arms control and disarmament agency working to stop India from acquiring nuclear weapons. Then I worked in the Sinai for four years to bring peace to Egypt, Israel, and the other Arab states. Thereafter, my assignment was to disarm Iraq after the Gulf War so that it could never again threaten the international community. The next assignment was to deal with Russia's nuclear programs, and, in particular, those programs that would involve technology transfers to countries such as Iran. I was then dispatched to deal with the North Korean nuclear program, and then, of course, to bring democracy and intercultural peace to Bosnia. So, what you have here is a string of uninterrupted diplomatic successes! Thinking back over my government career, it has been the triumph of experience over performance. Ever since the second grade in Sister Scholastica's class, I have benefited from being graded on effort!

Vulnerability

To appreciate the current situation with Iraq and North Korea and to understand the national security needs of the United States of America, one must come to grips with the concept of America's vulnerability. In fact, the one summary message from this evening's talk should be the word "vulnerability." The proposition is that the United States has not been so vulnerable as a nation

since 1814, when Washington, the Capital, was burned by the British. This is an extraordinary proposition. To have your capital burn is to be highly vulnerable.

Throughout the 19th century, we benefited from geography in extraordinary ways. There were oceans on two sides, a very competent navy, and non-threatening states to the north and south. We had the capacity for defense by denial. We could deny an enemy access to the United States throughout the 19th century. Early in the 20th century, the choice to engage in World War I was optional. In fact, it took awhile for President Woodrow Wilson to commit to the war, and we entered quite late. If you doubt this point, ask the British. They still hold a grudge for our late participation. We did not have to fight in World War I, and we continued the debate over engagement during the inter-war period. The internationalists said America's future lay with involvement in European affairs through alliances and relationships, and the isolationists said America could continue its isolationism because of its unique geographic situation.

The debate raged unresolved until the Second World War. The story of President Franklin Roosevelt's "enthusiasm" for our engagement in that war is well known. Of course, the choice to engage was removed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With the attack, we became vulnerable. But, Hawaii was not yet a state and it was an attack in the Pacific, quite removed from our shores. Were our shores attacked? Yes, there were submarines off the east coast.

By the end of the Second World War, however, circumstances had truly changed. If you consider parameters of vulnerability, there were two enormous changes. The first was air power. During the inter-war period, we started to debate what air power we need for our security. It certainly could have meant that we were going to be vulnerable from bombers that had intercontinental range, but that really was not the most significant change because you can shoot down bombers. It was the German V-2 attacks on Great Britain over 50 years ago that introduced the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles that we still cannot shoot down.

Suddenly, we were vulnerable to missiles.

The second change was, of course, the atomic bomb – one bomb, one city; thirty bombs, thirty cities. There is no defense. Load the bombs on missiles, and the cities are eliminated. Not since 1814 had we been so vulnerable. What was our response? We started to build air defense and then recognized that air defense could stop the bombers but could not do anything about the missiles. And what about nuclear weapons? We built offense, but how does offense protect the United States?

Deterrence

We developed a theory called deterrence. We defend ourselves against an enemy, not by stopping the enemy from attacking and destroying us, but by promising that after the enemy attacks us, we will respond so vigorously that the enemy will wish he had never attacked in the first place. Deterrence is based on the promise of retaliation, and the United States built a lot of offense to make the promise credible. We built intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). We put bombers on alert carrying nuclear bombs. We built the TRIAD. The Soviets did exactly the same thing. They built ICBMs and located them underground. They built submarines and loaded them with missiles, and they built long-range bombers to reach the United States. The Soviet Union and the United States had incredible offense to produce stable deterrence. Was that the result? No.

The intellectual part of the deterrence concept became apparent with an article by Albert Wolstetter, who taught many people who are in the current administration. Wolstetter's argument was that we should create a delicate balance of terror. He argued that offense alone does not guarantee security. It is the ability to respond to an attack that guarantees security. When an enemy attacks, if he disarms you, you cannot retaliate. An enemy who can only attack our cities is not so bad because in the period of deterrence you can promise retaliation. However, if an enemy

can disarm you and not even touch your cities, then you cannot retaliate. Suddenly, it became clear that our security depended on the survival of our offense. Survival was the key. This was the important conceptual breakthrough.

The second point is that deterrence is actually a psychological concept. An enemy would have to believe that after he struck the United States, we would strike back. The enemy would have to believe that the United States would not only respond, but also that the response would be so damaging that the enemy would regret having struck in the first place. There is nothing physical about deterrence – only the failure of deterrence. Therefore, the United States may think it can deter an enemy, but the enemy may doubt that there will be a significant response. If an enemy attacks and the United States retaliates, the enemy may regret its attack, but the United States could still be severely damaged. Simply put, people were unhappy in the 1960's with the realization that our defense against the Soviet Union depended on punishing an enemy after it had annihilated a significant part of our population.

We thought anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs) give us a real defense. Some of you are old enough to remember these various architectures, but you may not have been paying close attention. I was aware because I was a graduate student. The issue is the architecture. We had the safeguard system, the Sentinel system, the Spartan missile, and the Sprint missile. For example, the Spartan missile would intercept incoming missiles and shoot them down with nuclear detonation. Of course, the attack would come over the poles and the implications of shooting down missiles over Canada were not good from a Canadian perspective. Unfortunately, defense technology was not capable of dealing with the offensive missiles.

The simple concept called *The Offense/Defense Cost of Change Ratio* would take a whole lecture to describe. It meant that an increment of offense was cheaper than an increment of defense. You deploy defense to overcome an enemy's offense, and they respond by simply acquiring more offense. This made defense useless and this is one of many reasons why we

negotiated the ABM Treaty, which we recently dropped. It was a treaty that recognized that trying to defend yourself did not make any sense because it would lead an enemy to build more offense. The only defense and security was deterrence – the ability to retaliate. If you try to deny an enemy retaliation, the enemy will try to overbuild your defense so they can punish you. This is the strange world of deterrence.

We entered the 1970's with an ABM treaty denying us defense, still relying on deterrence, and deciding that the United States would build all kinds of offense because we kept having new theories about what would most threaten the enemy. First, we thought the enemy would worry about rebuilding after a nuclear war. If you read the Schlessinger Doctrine, you will find that the United States focused on stopping the Soviets from being able to rebuild. We organized our targeting doctrine and our core structure to stop rebuilding.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had the countervailing strategy. We emphasized strategies to determine the enemy's strategy because deterrence depends on psychology. We realized that the Soviets were digging really deep underground bunkers in the Soviet Union. We questioned what the Russians were doing. Were they trying to protect their industry? Actually they were trying to protect themselves, and we decided that we needed the capability to threaten the leadership, not their industry. We started targeting leadership and building particular kinds of special effect nuclear weapons that penetrate these bunkers to attack the Russian leadership and have the leadership realize that we would punish them in a way they would understand.

Star Wars and the Collapse of Russia

We were trying to achieve a measure of security to address our vulnerability. Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, and he did not like depending on deterrence. Edward Teller and his colleagues from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory offered a proposal to the President to reverse the cost-exchange

ratio. They recommended putting our missile defense in space to shoot down incoming missiles with lasers before they damaged the United States. This would reverse the cost-exchange ratio and make it cheaper to defend the country. President Reagan agreed, and the Star Wars program was developed in the 1980's. However, the result was not what many people expected. During the 1980's, the Soviets deployed many heavy missiles and the United States deployed many colorful view graphs. We did not really build any systems because we did not have the technology. It was a repeat of the 1960's. The United States had terrific view graphs, but we did not have space-based lasers and we did not deploy anything.

Then the Soviet Union collapsed, and some argue that part of the reason the Soviet Union collapsed was because they tried to build weapons in a way that cost them so much that they built themselves broke. The important point is that the issue disappeared for a decade. The first George Bush administration did not do much about missile defense and neither did the Clinton administration. We did research and development but no deployment. At the end of his administration, in Gaston Hall at Georgetown University, President Bill Clinton gave a speech explaining that he was not going to make a ballistic missile decision before leaving office. The decision would be left to the next administration.

Bush's Goal of Strategic Dominance

President George W. Bush came into office committed not only to national missile defense but also to strategic dominance. Chapter Nine of the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, issued last September, states, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States." We are not only going to be stronger than everyone else, but we are also going to be so strong that no one will consider competing. It is an extraordinary statement of American dominance.

It is worth noting that there are five elements to the Bush strategy:

(1) No more arms control treaties. Arms control treaties, whether they were negotiated by Democrats or Republicans, have always disadvantaged the United States. What we do best is to compete. The United States has the best technology on earth. When we sign a treaty, we constrain our technologies. We do not need to do that. If we make no treaty with the Russians, they will deteriorate and the United States will advance. In fact, there were no treaties in the initial Bush policy. We signed the Strategic Arms Reduction (SAR) treaty because it does not bind us, but it does placate the Russians as we withdraw from the ABM treaty. What about all the multilateral treaties? They are history. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) treaty is an example. The countries that are not part of the NPT – India, Pakistan, and Israel – build nuclear weapons. The countries that are signatories of the NPT – Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea – all cheat. Therefore, what good are multilateral treaties? Either they do not include the countries that concern us, or they are included, but they cheat. What is the point of the United States joining these treaties? Therefore, no more treaties.

(2) Recognize that Russia is no longer a traditional threat to the United States. It is a non-traditional threat, which means that Russia is not going to be a great power in the near future. However, it does have nuclear material – plutonium and highly enriched uranium – nuclear weapons, nuclear scientists, and biological weapons technology, all of which may “leak” out by unauthorized transfers. The Russian Mafia can even purposely transfer ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Iran. Therefore, Russia represents a non-traditional threat from leakage or transfer.

(3) Understand that China is a great power threat. China is building a blue water navy, increasing its conventional force projection capability, and modernizing its strategic forces. We talk about “engagement” in our dealings with China, but what we really mean is containment.

(4) We cannot deal with rogue states by traditional non-proliferation policy. The only way to deal with rogues is with counter-proliferation. We cannot deal with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya by negotiating. That is a fool's game. You deal with this threat by the use of force in a preventive war or a preemptive strike, or by the threat of using force if that will work, but negotiation is naïve and destructive to the national security.

(5) Finally, it is necessary to have a national missile defense system that is perceived as working. It would be good if it worked, but, most important, it must be perceived as working. With a national missile defense system, one can deal with the rogue states and the Chinese, two groups about whom we are really worried. China is vulnerable to us because we can disarm them with a first strike. The Chinese have only a few dozen ICBMs, not a credible deterrent against the United States. However, they are building mobile ICBMs that will be more difficult to target. Therefore, we need a national missile defense so that anything we fail to destroy when we strike first would be intercepted by our national missile defense. This will intimidate and deter them. If China threatens Taiwan, we implicitly threaten to move to the strategic level. This is called escalation dominance. If we do not do well at sea, we can advance to a level where we can deal with them strategically.

These are the five points that I think capture the key elements of the Bush Administration's national security strategy prior to 9/11. I think 9/11 is important to the psychology of our administration. Suddenly, we are more vulnerable than we have ever been before, and our government knows that. We are not worried mainly about airplanes crashing into more buildings. We are worried about terrorists getting one of two kinds of weapons of mass destruction, a nuclear weapon or a biological weapon, such as small pox, which can kill hundreds of thousands of people.

We are worried because we have no defense against an unconventional attack, and the new fear is that we have no deterrence either. We cannot defend our country against United

Airlines, container ships, or Ryder trucks if they are used as weapons. We cannot deter an attack if we cannot determine the source of the attack. If New York is destroyed tomorrow morning, many people may take credit. You may never know who did it, and if you are able to find out who, you may not find them. Where do you look for Al Qaeda? Are they in Afghanistan, or the Philippines, or in 40 other countries? If you find out who attacked you and where they are located, they may not be there anymore by the time you are ready to retaliate. If you find out who attacked, where they are located, and if they are still there, then the biggest problem of all is that they may not care whether you attack them. These terrorists have demonstrated that they are prepared to die for their cause.

Deter? You do not. Defend? You do not. The United States has not been this vulnerable since 1814, and the administration knows it.

There is an organization that used to be called the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). I do not know the current name. It combines special operations capability with nuclear weapons design and manufactures knowledge. It exists to discover and disarm bombs, particularly nuclear bombs. If a bomb is thought to be in the Baltimore Harbor, near the Capital, or in New York, for example, NEST is supposed to find it and to disarm it. There are reports that since 9/11, NEST has deployed to Washington, DC.

Another highly secret program was the Continuity of Government (CoG) program. In the 1980's, some of us who worked in government used to disappear for a weekend. We would go someplace remote from Washington and play a kind of war game. We slept in bunk beds and ate cafeteria food. When we came back, we all lied about where we had been. When I was Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we discontinued CoG. A CoG-like program is back. We make jokes about where is the Vice President. It is not only the Vice President who disappears, and he is not disappearing because it is an exercise. These people are disappearing so you will have a government if Washington, DC, is

destroyed. The situation is serious.

What should the administration do after 9/11? There was the “Axis of Evil” speech. It focused on those states with the capability to do the greatest harm. There was the Nuclear Posture Review leak when we learned that our nuclear weapons target not only the “Axis of Evil” states but also Syria and Libya. Then there was the West Point speech and the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, both of which delineate the argument for preemption.

Preemption Doctrine

In Chapter Five of the *National Security Strategy*, entitled “Preventing Our Enemies from Threatening the United States, Our Allies or Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” we are instructed that as a matter of law and tradition any state could protect itself by acting preeminently. We do not have to wait for an enemy to attack if an enemy is about to harm us. The United States can act first and still be moral, legal, and ethical. In the Bush version of this concept, we need not wait for an enemy to do anything, such as gathering his army, which signals the intent to attack us. We cannot wait for this. In fact, and I quote, “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat, taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to time and place of the enemy’s attack.” In other words, I do not know when or where an enemy is going to attack the United States, but I am going to destroy him, because he may attack me at some time in the future. That is our asserted right in our country’s national security strategy.

That is extraordinary, but in the lingo of deterrence and strategy, it is not preemption. Preemption is to attack immediately before the enemy attacks us. Our preemption is really called preventive war. If a potential enemy is weak, but could become strong, we may destroy him when he is weak so that we do not have to worry about the eventuality. The United States had such an opportunity against the Soviets between 1945 and 1949. We

debated the idea of attacking the Soviets before they had nuclear weapons, but decided against it. We also decided not to attack those Soviet missiles being emplaced in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. If we had, it would have been preventive war.

Current Threats and Policy

Has the United States responded to this very real, new threat with the right policy? I would argue that turning preemption/preventive war into a public American doctrine is both gratuitous and provocative. I do not understand how we can avoid extending to another country the right of self-defense by preemption or preventive war if we claim it as a matter of policy and doctrine for ourselves. How can we issue a public document on preemption in September 2002 and not extend the same right to India to attack Pakistan, or Pakistan to attack India, or China to attack Taiwan, or Israel to attack any number of states in the Middle East, or for any of these states to attack Israel ? Are we the only one who has this right?

Second, in the view of our allies, the United States has shown disregard for international organizational activity and United Nations Security Council action. This could cost us dearly when we want help from other countries in dealing with the principal threat to our security that comes from terrorists and nuclear terrorists in particular.

Third, I think that the assertion of the right to preempt is gratuitous. Who would be surprised to learn that your president, whomever it is, was going to do whatever was necessary to defend the security of our country? I would think that is his obligation. When he took the oath, he said he would defend the country. If it requires preventive action, we will do it, but we do not need to enshrine this as doctrine and announce it. This is an American right.

Let us consider the cases. Is Iraq a threat to the national security of the United States right now? I think if it were possible

to link Iraq to the attacks of 9/11, any president who did not attack Iraq forthwith should be impeached. I do not think the connection has been made. The argument for war in Iraq, and for deciding to fight it now (March 4, 2003) at the cost of relations with friends and allies, no matter how well and quickly a war goes, must be made on other grounds.

With respect to North Korea, the case of our current posture of refusing to engage Pyongyang in direct, bilateral talks is strained in my view. It is a posture that may well prove costly and unnecessary. Let us deal with both Iraq and North Korea in considerable depth and in discussion.

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